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Judicial Independence Revisited
Lori Sterling and Sean Hanley

I. INTRODUCTION
On July 22, 2005, the Supreme Court of Canada rendered a unanimous
decision in four consolidated appeals dealing with the appropriate
process for setting judicial compensation.1 In so doing, it revised the
minimum constitutional requirements of judicial financial security that
had been previously addressed in its 1997 decision in the Provincial
Judges Reference,2 and confirmed the need for curial deference to
government decisions on judicial compensation.
Shortly after the 1997 decision, a number of judicial compensation
commissions had recommended substantial salary increases. These
increases were generally based on the increase in duties of provincial
court judges, a desire to narrow the salary differential with federal
superior court judges and growth in the economy. 3 Governments did not



Lori Sterling is Assistant Deputy Attorney General, Legal Services Division and Sean
Hanley is counsel with the Constitutional Law Branch of the Attorney General for Ontario. The
authors represented Ontario in the judicial compensation appeals before the Supreme Court of
Canada (Provincial Court Judges Assn. of New Brunswick v. New Brunswick (Minster of Justice);
Ontario Judges Assn. v. Ontario (Management Board); Bodner v. Alberta; Conférence des juges du
Québec v. Quebec (Attorney General; Minc v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 47,
2005 SCC 44 [hereinafter “Provincial Judges Compensation Appeals”]. The opinions expressed
herein are those of the authors and do not represent the opinions of the Attorney General or the
Government of Ontario.
1
In terms of the timing of the decision, it is interesting to note that the Supreme Court of
Canada’s decision followed shortly after the Court’s decision in Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney
General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 33, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 a controversial, split-court decision respecting
the rights of persons to access private health care services when faced with excessive wait times for
public services.
2
Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island;
Reference re Independence and Impartiality of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward
Island; R. v. Campbell; R. v. Ekmecic; R. v. Wickman; Manitoba Provincial Judges Assn. v.
Manitoba (Minister of Justice), [1997] S.C.J. No. 75, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3 [hereinafter “Provincial
Judges Reference”].
3
In particular, federal superior court judges received substantial increases in
compensation. As provincial court judges argued for narrowing the gap with federal superior court
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typically accept all of the recommendations and the judicial associations
sought judicial review.
In an unusually frank decision, the Supreme Court of Canada stated
that it had hoped that the requirement of the commission process set out
in 1997 in the Provincial Judges Reference would ensure the depoliticization of decisions respecting judicial compensation but that
“instead of diminishing friction between judges and government, the
result has been to exacerbate it”. The Court also stated that it intended in
its decision to clarify the principles of the compensation commission
process in order to avoid a continuation of these conflicts in the future.4
The Court confirmed that the compensation commission is essential
to the determination of both provincial court judges’ and justices of the
peace’s financial security. Nevertheless, the commission process is
recommendatory and not binding on government. The government must
seriously consider the recommendations but need not follow them.
The Court also dealt specifically with the standard of review for
decisions on compensation, and set a very high threshold of deference to
the government’s decision. In so doing, the Court signalled that it would
not overturn government decisions except in rare circumstances.
In this paper, we examine whether the Court’s stated goal of
limiting future litigation will be achieved. We conclude that indeed
litigation respecting judicial compensation is likely to be curbed in the
near future. Nevertheless the commission process will remain robust and
there is even likely to be increased emphasis on the evidence and
submissions presented by the parties to the commission.
The Supreme Court decision also leaves some important questions
unanswered. In reaffirming the commission process as integral to the
determination of judicial compensation, the decision provides little
incentive for the development of any less adversarial relationship
between government and the judiciary, comparable to that which arises
in traditional labour relations. While some precedents for consensus
building exist, the Supreme Court does not indicate in this decision how
receptive it would be to a relationship developing between the judiciary
and government that involves consultations and discussions concerning
compensation.

judges and federal superior court judges argued for further salary increases following each increase
for provincial judges, the two groups’ compensation continued to be “ratcheted” upward.
4
Provincial Judges Compensation Appeals, [2005] S.C.J. No. 47, 2005 SCC 44, at paras.
11-12.
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As well, the Court decision leaves open the question of how the
judicial independence requirements will be applied to other decisionmakers in the judicial system apart from provincial judges and justices
of the peace. The decision does not address the application of the
constitutional financial security principles to traffic commissioners,
deputy judges, masters, or other decision-making bodies associated with
the courts.

II. FRAMEWORK FOR JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE PRINCIPLES
There are three core components of judicial independence: financial
security, security of tenure and administrative independence. Each of
these components consists of minimum guarantees that must be in place
to ensure the independence of judges and courts.5
The basic minimum protections required to ensure judicial financial
security, prior to the 1997 Provincial Judges Reference, were that (i)
salaries be established by law; and (ii) that there be an absence of direct
salary negotiations.6 Judicial independence could also be impaired if
there were the appearance of salary manipulation motivated by an
improper or colourable purpose, or discriminatory treatment of judges.7
The Provincial Judges Reference added the requirement that judicial
salaries not be increased, decreased or frozen without an inquiry and
non-binding recommendation by an independent, objective and effective
compensation commission process.8
The basic requirement of security of tenure is that judges be
appointed until an age of retirement, for a fixed term, or for a specific
adjudicative task, and that their tenure be secure against arbitrary or
discretionary interference by the Executive or other appointing
authority.9 Courts have applied particular requirements flexibly to
different types of decision makers.10 For instance, superior court judges’
appointments apply constitutionally until age 75 and they may only be
5
R. v. Valente, [1985] S.C.J. No. 77, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 673, at 694, 704, 706 S.C.R.;
Provincial Judges Reference, supra, note 2, at para. 115.
6
Valente, id., at 704-706.
7
Beauregard v. Canada, [1986] S.C.J. No. 50, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 56, at 77.
8
Provincial Judges Reference, supra, note 2, at para. 147.
9
Valente, supra, note 5, at 694-95 S.C.R.
10
R. v. Généreux, [1992] S.C.J. No. 10, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 259, at 285 S.C.R.; Ell v. Alberta,
[2003] S.C.J. No. 35, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 857, at para. 31; R. v. Lippé, [1990] S.C.J. No. 128, [1991] 2
S.C.R. 114, at 142 S.C.R.; Re Therrien, [2001] S.C.J. No. 36, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 65-67.
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removed from office on the joint address of Parliament and the Senate.11
The guarantee of security of tenure also requires that provincial court
judges only be removed from office for cause related to capacity to
perform judicial functions, and there be a judicial inquiry to establish
that such cause exists, at which the judge must be given an opportunity
to be heard.12
The basic requirement of administrative independence is control by
the courts “over the administrative decisions that bear directly and
immediately on the exercise of the judicial function”. These were
defined in what the Court has described as “narrow terms” consisting of
the “assignment of judges, sittings of the court, and court lists — as well
as the related matters of allocation of court rooms and direction of the
administrative staff engaged in carrying out these functions...”.13

III. THE 1997 PROVINCIAL JUDGES REFERENCE
The 1997 Provincial Judges Reference was a landmark decision in two
respects. First, the Court expressly recognized “unwritten constitutional
principles” as a legitimate source for constitutional rules.14 In addition, it
held that the Constitution commission process was necessary for
inquiring into and making recommendations on the appropriate level of
judicial compensation.15
1. New Constitutional Sources — Unwritten Constitutional
Principles
Prior to the 1997 Provincial Judges Reference, the Canadian
Constitution was considered to derive almost exclusively from the
11
Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App II,
No. 5, s. 99.
12
Valente, supra, note 5, at 697-98; Provincial Judges Reference, supra, note 2, at para.
115; Re Therrien, supra, note 10, at para. 39; Provincial Judges Compensation Appeals, supra,
note 4, at para. 40; The federal Judges Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. J-1, s. 64, establishes similar
requirements for federally appointed judges (see also Cosgrove v. Canadian Judicial Council,
[2005] F.C.J. No. 1748, under appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal).
13
Valente, supra, note 5, at 709, 712 S.C.R.; Provincial Judges Reference, supra, note 2,
at para. 117.
14
Provincial Judges Reference, supra, note 2, at paras. 82-109. See also Chief Justice
Beverley McLachlin, “Unwritten Constitutional Principles: What is Going On?”, Remarks given at
the 2005 Lord Cooke Lecture, Wellington, New Zealand, at 19, 27.
15
Provincial Judges Reference, supra, note 2, at paras. 166-85.
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Constitution’s text.16 Adopting a novel approach, Lamer C.J. held, for
the majority, that the Canadian Constitution includes not only text but
also unwritten principles, which derive from the Preamble to the
Constitution Act, 1867. The requirement of judicial independence was
described as “at root an unwritten constitutional principle” and “[t]he
specific provisions of the Constitution Acts, 1867 to 1982, merely
‘elaborate that principle in the institutional apparatus which they create
or contemplate’”.17 This reasoning extends judicial independence
principles from their previously understood application to superior and
provincial courts to apply to “all courts no matter what kind of cases
they hear”.18
The 1997 Provincial Judges Reference was decided under section
11(d) of the Charter and the majority’s comments on unwritten
constitutional principles were obiter dicta. While these principles have
been referred to in subsequent cases, their significance has been limited.
More recently, it has been confirmed that they do not afford greater
protection than that guaranteed by the Constitution’s text.19 The
Supreme Court has also refrained from using unwritten principles to
strike down legislation,20 and recently granted leave to appeal from a
British Columbia Court of Appeal decision in which the majority
declared legislation to be unconstitutional because it offended the “rule
of law” principle.21 In the past, the Supreme Court of Canada has denied
leave to appeal from decisions refusing to invalidate legislation on the

16
A partial exception was the “implied bill of rights” theory, which according to some
members of the Court, restricted the ability of the legislatures to limit individual expression.
However, this approach to constitutional interpretation had not previously been expressly adopted
by a majority of the Court (see Reference re Alberta Legislation, [1938] S.C.R. 100, at 133-34 (per
Duff C.J.) and at 146 (per Cannon J.), affd [1938] 4 D.L.R. 433 (P.C.); Saumur v. Quebec (City),
[1953] 2 S.C.R. 299, at 330-31 (per Rand J.) and at 354-56 (per Kellock J.); Switzman v. Ebling,
[1957] S.C.R. 285, at 307 (per Rand J.) and at 328 (per Abbott J.); OPSEU v. Ontario (Attorney
General), [1987] 2 S.C.R. 2, at 57 (per Beetz J.).
17
Provincial Judges Reference, supra, note 2, at paras. 83, 106-107.
18
Id., at para. 107.
19
Re Therrien, supra, note 10, at para. 68.
20
Babcock v. Canada Attorney General, [2002] S.C.J. No. 58, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 3, at paras.
54-57; British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., [2005] S.C.J. No. 50, [2005] 2 S.C.R.
473, at paras. 61-68.
21
Christie v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2005] B.C.J. No. 2745, 48 B.C.L.R.
(4th) 267, at para. 76 (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. granted [2006] S.C.C.A. No. 59.
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basis of unwritten principles,22 and provincial courts of appeal have
otherwise not gone further than to apply unwritten principles in
reviewing discretionary decision-making.23 While not reversing itself,
the Supreme Court has now signalled that the possibility of a new
constitutional right emanating from the preamble, is much diminished.
2. The Commission Process
The Provincial Judges Reference also established for the first time the
constitutional requirement of judicial compensation commissions with a
mandate to review and make recommendations on provincial judges’
compensation every three to five years. The role of these commissions
was to “depoliticize” the relationship between judges and governments
to ensure that the setting of judicial compensation was based on
objective considerations.24
The Court emphasized that compensation commissions were to be
“independent, objective and effective”. By “independent”, the Court
meant that they should have members chosen by both the government
and the judiciary. Members must also have security of tenure in that
they serve for a fixed term.25
By “objective” the Court meant that the commissions “must make
recommendations on judges’ remuneration by reference to objective
criteria, not political expediencies”. The Court stated that objectivity
could be achieved by having the commission hear submissions from the
provincial judges associations and the government, though this process
was not constitutionally required. The Court also recommended, but did
not require, that objectivity be promoted by including in the
commission’s enabling legislation or regulation a list of relevant factors
to guide the commission’s deliberations.26

22

Bacon v. Saskatchewan Crop Insurance Corp., [1999] S.J. No. 302, 180 Sask. R. 20, at
paras. 29-30 (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [1999] S.C.C.A. No. 437; Singh v. Canada
(Attorney General), [2000] F.C.J. No. 4, [2000] 3 F.C. 185, at para. 36 (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C.
refused, [2000] S.C.C.A. No. 92; New York Life Insurance Co. c. Vaughan, [2003] J.Q. no 89 (C.A.),
leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [2002] C.S.C.R. No. 470; Baie D’Urfé (Ville) c. Québec (Procureur
général), [2001] J.Q. no 4821 (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [2001] C.S.C.R. 524.
23
Lalonde v. Ontario (Commission de restructuration des services de santé), [2001] O.J.
No. 4767, 56 O.R. (3d) 505 (C.A.).
24
Provincial Judges Reference, supra, note 2, at para. 147.
25
Id., at paras. 171-72.
26
Id., at para. 173.
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Finally, commissions must be “effective”. The Court emphasized
that this did not mean that their recommendations were binding. The
commission process must, however, “have a meaningful effect on the
determination of judicial salaries”. This requires, as a minimum
constitutional standard, that the government formally respond to the
commission’s recommendations and provide reasons for any decision
not to implement a particular recommendation.27
A government’s reasons for not accepting a commission
recommendation are subject to judicial review on a standard of “simple
rationality”. Chief Justice Lamer emphasized that “[a] reviewing court
does not engage in a searching analysis of the relationship between ends
and means, which is the hallmark of a s. 1 analysis”. Rather, the
standard of simple rationality is described as follows:
First, it screens out decisions with respect to judicial remuneration
which are based on purely political considerations, or which are
enacted for discriminatory reasons. Changes to or freezes in
remuneration can only be justified for reasons which relate to the
public interest, broadly understood. Second, if judicial review is
sought, a reviewing court must inquire into the reasonableness of the
factual foundation of the claim made by the government, similar to the
way that we have evaluated whether there was an economic
emergency in Canada in our jurisprudence under the division of
powers (Reference re Anti-Inflation Act, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373).28

3. Dissenting Opinion
The 1997 Court decision was not unanimous. In his dissenting reasons,
La Forest J. criticized the majority’s decision to make novel
pronouncements on the source of constitutional principles and the
requirement of a judicial compensation commission, without the benefit
of full argument. Justice La Forest also questioned the appropriateness
of the Court making such far-reaching conclusions that were not
necessary to determine the case before it on “an issue on which judges
can hardly be seen to be indifferent, especially as it concerns their own
remuneration”.29

27
28
29

Id., at paras. 174-80.
Id., at para. 183.
Id., at para. 302, La Forest J. (dissenting).
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Justice La Forest disagreed with the majority’s view that unwritten
constitutional principles provided limitations on the power of legislatures
to interfere with judicial independence.30 In his opinion, judicial review of
legislative actions derives its legitimacy from textual constitutional limits
on legislative power and changes to these constitutionally entrenched
principles should arise through constitutional amendment, not resort to
underlying unwritten principles.31
Justice La Forest also rejected the notion that changes to judicial
compensation would necessarily interfere with judicial independence if
they were not the product of a judicial compensation commission
inquiry and recommendation. In particular, he was of the view that the
decrease to judicial salaries before the Court in the Provincial Judges
Reference, which were part of an overall economic measure affecting
substantially all persons paid from public funds, would not cause a
reasonable person to perceive that the independence or impartiality of
judges had been compromised.32

IV. THE 2005 PROVINCIAL JUDGES COMPENSATION APPEALS
1. Decisions of Appellate Courts
Since the 1997 Provincial Judges Reference, governments have frequently
rejected judicial compensation commissions’ recommendations.
Associations representing the judiciary have consistently challenged these
decisions and courts, with few exceptions, have overturned the
governments’ decisions on judicial review. In various provinces, superior
and/or appellate courts that reviewed government reasons either applied
the simple rationality standard with heightened rigour33 or departed from
30

Id., at para. 304, La Forest J. (dissenting).
Id., at para. 314, La Forest J. (dissenting).
32
Id., at para. 337, La Forest J. (dissenting).
33
Alberta Provincial Judges Assn. v. Alberta, [1999] A.J. No. 863, 177 D.L.R. (4th) 418,
at paras. 35-40 (C.A.); Provincial Court Judges’ Assn. of New Brunswick v. New Brunswick
(Minister of Justice), [2003] N.B.J. No. 321, 231 D.L.R. (4th) 38, at para. 123 (C.A.); Conférence
des juges du Québec v. Québec (Attorney General), [2004] J.Q. No. 6622, [2004] R.J.Q. 1450, at
paras. 47, 50-52 (C.A.); Manitoba Provincial Judges Assn. v. Manitoba (Minister of Justice),
[2001] M.J. No. 339, 202 D.L.R. (4th) 698, at paras. 42-43 (Q.B.); Newfoundland Assn. of
Provincial Court Judges v. Newfoundland, [2000] N.J. No. 258, 191 D.L.R. (4th) 225, at para. 95
(C.A.); Provincial Court Judges’ Assn. of British Columbia v. British Columbia (Attorney
General), [1998] B.C.J. No. 1230, 160 D.L.R. (4th) 477, at paras. 28-29 (C.A.), leave to appeal to
S.C.C. refused [1998] S.C.C.A. No. 401.
31
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the Provincial Judges Reference to create new, exacting standards for
governments to meet.34
The majority of the Alberta Court of Appeal in Bodner v. Alberta is
an example of courts imposing new standards. Justice Paperny, for the
majority of the Alberta Court of Appeal, stated that a government must
demonstrate “extraordinary circumstances” before departing from a
commission recommendation and that on judicial review “a court must
conduct a thorough and searching examination of the reasons
proffered”.35
The Alberta Court of Appeal’s description of the standard of review
stands in contrast to the majority approach in the Provincial Judges
Reference. The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada had held that a
reviewing court “does not engage in a searching analysis of the
relationship between ends and means, which is the hallmark of a s. 1
analysis”.36 Further, the Alberta Court of Appeal’s requirement of
“extraordinary circumstances” elevated the compensation commission’s
role from that of a consultative body to a decision-making body whose
recommendations could rarely be rejected.
The Quebec and New Brunswick Courts of Appeal are examples of
Courts that purported to apply the simple rationality standard of review
but did so with heightened rigour. Both appellate courts disagreed with
the Alberta Court of Appeal’s description of the standard of review as
“searching” and requiring extraordinary circumstances. Nevertheless,
both of these courts in practice subjected the decisions of their
respective provincial governments to exacting scrutiny.37
The Ontario courts, by contrast, adopted a deferential approach that
was based on the Court’s articulation of the standard of review in the
1997 Provincial Judges Reference. Of the four provincial appellate
courts whose decisions were appealed from, the Ontario Court of

34
Bodner v. Alberta, [2002] A.J. No. 1428, 222 D.L.R. (4th) 284, at para. 130 (C.A.), revd
[2005] S.C.J. No. 47; La Conférence des Juges du Québec v. Québec (Procureure Générale),
[2000] J.Q. no 3772, 196 D.L.R. (4th) 533, at para. 42 (C.A.); see also comments of MacCallum J.
in Alberta Provincial Judges’ Assn. v. Alberta, [2004] A.J. No. 936, 41 Alta. L.R. (4th) 153, at
paras. 111-18 (Q.B.).
35
Bodner, id., at para. 108.
36
Provincial Judges Reference, supra, note 2, at para. 183.
37
Provincial Court Judges Assn. of New Brunswick v. New Brunswick, supra, note 33, at
paras. 110, 123; Quebec (Attorney General) v. Conférence des juges du Québec, supra, note 33, at
paras. 28, 47, 50-52.
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Appeal’s approach was most consistent with the revised standard of
review ultimately adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada.38
In Ontario, the Judicial Remuneration Commission is statutorily
empowered to issue binding recommendations on salary and most
benefits. Recommendations on pensions, however, are not binding and
are subject to the requirement that the government give rational reasons
before departing from the recommendations. The Ontario government
implemented the recommendations of the Judicial Remuneration
Commission issued in 1999, which included a 28 per cent salary
increase, but chose not to accept recommendations for reformulating the
judges’ pension plan.
The Judges’ Associations’ application for judicial review of the
decision to reject the pension enhancements was dismissed. On appeal,
the Ontario Court of Appeal expressly disagreed with the Alberta Court
of Appeal’s characterization of the standard of simple rationality in
Bodner. The Ontario Court of Appeal explained that the simple
rationality standard called only for “a cautious and modest review”:
It is not an exaggeration to say that the juxtaposition chosen by Lamer
C.J.C. is one between the strictest (s. 1 of the Charter, especially as
represented by its original formulation in R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R.
103, 26 D.L.R. (4th) 200) and the most deferential (declaration of
economic emergency in a distribution of powers context) standards of
review in the history of Canadian constitutional law. The former is
truly rigorous, as it should be given that the context is a government’s
attempt to justify a continuation of its infringement of a constitutional
right protected by the Charter. The latter is truly deferential, as it
should be given that the context is a government’s attempt to deal with
a matter concerning “social and economic policy and hence
governmental and legislative judgment” (Reference re Anti-Inflation
Act (Canada), [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373, 68 D.L.R. (3d) 452, at pp. 422-24
S.C.R., pp. 495-96 D.L.R.).39

38

Ontario Judges’ Assn. v. Ontario (Management Board), [2005] S.C.J. No. 47, at para.
165, affg [2003] O.J. No. 4155, 67 O.R. (3d) 641 (C.A.), affg [2002] O.J. No. 533, 58 O.R. (3d)
186 (Div. Ct.).
39
Ontario Judges Assn., id., at para. 65.
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2. Elaboration of the Financial Security Requirements of the 2005
Provincial Judges Reference
(a) Commission Recommendations are Non-Binding
In its decision on the consolidated appeals from Ontario, Quebec, New
Brunswick and Alberta, the Court strongly affirmed the remuneration or
compensation commission process as a constitutional imperative. The
purpose of the commission was to hear evidence and submissions and
make recommendations to government. Unless the legislature provides
that the report is binding, the government retains the power to depart
from the commission’s recommendations, as long as it justifies its
decision with rational reasons.40
(b) Reasons for Rejection to be Provided by Government
The Court also affirmed the necessity of a government response to the
recommendations and elaborated on the nature of the reasons required
of government. First, the government must act in good faith and its
responses must be “legitimate”. The Court’s discussion of the
requirements of legitimacy indicates that the reasons must:
•

state in what respect and to what extent they depart from the
recommendations, articulating the grounds for rejection or variation;

•

deal with the commission’s recommendations in a meaningful way
and show that the commission’s recommendations have been taken
into account;

•

be based on facts and sound reasoning;

•

be compatible with the common law and the Constitution;

•

include consideration of the judicial office and an intention to deal
with it appropriately;

•

preclude any suggestion of attempting to manipulate the judiciary;
and

40

Provincial Judges Compensation Appeals, supra, note 4, at paras. 19-21.
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reflect the underlying public interest in having a commission
process, being the depoliticization of the remuneration process and
the need to preserve judicial independence.41

The reasons must also be based on a “reasonable factual
foundation”. That factual foundation ought to be explicit, and should not
be based on facts that could have been put before the Commission but
were not.42 Importantly, however, the response can properly include new
facts or circumstances arising after the release of the recommendations.
The reasons can also be based on facts relating to verification of the
accuracy of the information in the commission report.43
What is clear from the Court’s discussion about the reasons is that
the Court is not interested in parsing every detail of the government’s
response. Instead, the government response must simply be in good faith
and based on a reasonable factual foundation.
(c) Judicial Review of Decisions on Judicial Compensation
(i) Evidence Admissible on Judicial Review
In both Ontario and New Brunswick, the Court admitted affidavit
evidence filed by the provincial governments to support their reasons for
rejecting the commission’s recommendation.44 In Ontario, the affidavit
was provided by an actuary who was retained to analyze and calculate
the costs of the Commission’s pension recommendations in light of the
Commission’s binding salary increase. This evidence explained and
expanded on the factual foundation supporting the government’s
reasons.
In New Brunswick, the government filed actuarial evidence similar
to that filed in Ontario. In addition, the government filed three affidavits
from civil servants that set out internal estimations of the cost of the
Commission’s recommendations, economic conditions in the province
and salary increases within the civil service.45
The Court held that all of the affidavits filed in the Ontario and New
Brunswick proceedings were admissible. The Court confirmed that
41
42
43
44
45

Id., at paras. 22-27.
Id., at paras. 36, 62, 103.
Id., at paras. 26-27.
Id., at paras. 64, 103.
Id., at para. 60.
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governments would not be permitted to adduce new facts that could
have been advanced before the commission at the time of its inquiry, but
were not. It is appropriate, however, for governments to provide added
detail of the economic and actuarial information on which it relied in
reaching the decision. In the Court’s view, the affidavits filed by both
New Brunswick and Ontario did not advance new arguments, which
ought to have been made before the Commission. They simply provided
specifics of the factual foundation relied upon by the government and
demonstrated the governments’ good faith in taking the recommendations seriously.46
(ii) Standard of Review
While much of the 2005 decision can be said to be merely a
confirmation of the earlier approach, the articulation of the standard of
judicial review does constitute a reformulation or, at the very least, a
clarification. Specifically, the Court added a third component to the twostage analysis required in the 1997 Provincial Judges Reference.47
Previously, the reviewing court had to ask whether the government: (i)
articulated a legitimate reason for departing from the commission’s
recommendations; and (ii) whether its decision relies on a reasonable
factual foundation.48 Now, the reviewing court must also ask whether:
Viewed globally, has the commission process been respected and have
the purposes of the commission — preserving judicial independence
and depoliticizing the setting of judicial remuneration — been
achieved?49

This new criterion appears to set a significantly higher threshold
since it allows for the government to make some mistakes, provided it
engages in the process in good faith.50 The reviewing court need only
assess broadly whether the process, as a whole, suggests a failure to
engage in an objective determination of the appropriate level of judicial
compensation such that a reasonable person would perceive an
interference with judicial independence. Minor errors or omissions
would not be a basis for judicial review.
46
47
48
49
50

Id., at paras. 60-64, 103.
Id., at paras. 30, 35, 38, 40, 83, 98, 127.
Provincial Judges Reference, supra, note 2, at para. 183.
Provincial Judges Compensation Appeals, supra, note 4, at para. 31.
Id., at para. 83.
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(d) Application of Principles in the Four Appeals
The Court upheld the decisions of the Governments of Alberta, Ontario
and New Brunswick not to accept the recommendations of the judicial
remuneration commissions in those provinces. The decision of the
Quebec government was rejected as failing to meet the standard of
simple rationality.
The Court accepted a broad range of reasons for rejecting
commission recommendations, provided they were responsive to the
commission recommendations and related either to the appropriate level
of judicial compensation, or to the appropriate factors to take into
account in determining compensation levels. In the appeals, the Court
accepted the following government considerations in rejecting
commission recommendations:
•

comparisons with public sector compensation, private lawyers, other
provincial court judges and federal superior court judges;

•

provincial economic conditions;

•

past compensation increases; and

•

factual errors in the commission’s report.51

The Court also confirmed that it was inappropriate for commissions
to base their recommendations on any one aspect of compensation in
isolation. For instance, the Court confirmed that it was inappropriate to
simply set provincial judges’ salaries at a percentage (e.g., 85 per cent)
of superior judges’ salaries without consideration of other relevant
factors.52 The Court also confirmed the failure of the Ontario
Commission to take into account the salary increase (on its own and its
impact on pensions) when making recommendations to improve the
pension plan.53
While the Court accepted most of the reasons advanced by the
governments involved in the appeals, it did not accept all of them. It
rejected as illegitimate the reason advanced by New Brunswick that the
commission recommendations should only focus on the “minimum”
salary required to guarantee judicial independence.54 The Court also
51
52
53
54

Id., at paras. 68-79, 95-97, 123-26.
Id., at para. 72.
Id., at para. 96.
Id., at para. 67.
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rejected the reason advanced by Quebec that the Commission could only
make recommendations to adjust compensation from the Commission’s
previous report. The Court also criticized Quebec for focusing on the
impact that the Commission’s recommendations would have on the
overall labour relations policy in Quebec’s public sector, without being
responsive to the Commission’s reasons for recommending changes to
judicial compensation.55
With respect to the new and last part of the test, the Court held that
the decisions of the Governments of Alberta, Ontario and New
Brunswick, viewed globally and with deference, reflected respect for the
commission process and the purposes of preserving judicial
independence and depoliticizing the setting of judicial remuneration.
While some of New Brunswick’s reasons were described as
“unsatisfactory”, the Court found that on balance “the response shows
that the Government took the process seriously”.56 By contrast, the
Court concluded that the Quebec government failed “to consider what
should be the appropriate level of compensation for judges, as its
primary concerns were to avoid raising expectations in other parts of the
public sector and to safeguard the traditional structure of its pay
scales”.57

V. RAMIFICATIONS OF COURT’S DECISION
1. Impact on Future Litigation
In this paper, we have suggested that the Court’s desire to reduce
litigation over judicial compensation may well bear fruit. This is based
on three aspects of the Court’s decision: the standard of review, the
remedy available to the judiciary even if it is successful on judicial
review and the potential for the losing party to pay for the costs of
litigation.

55
56
57

Id., at paras. 158-65.
Id., at para. 83.
Id., at para. 160.
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(a) A Deferential Standard of Review
In its decision, the Court rejected arguments by judicial associations that
either commission recommendations should be binding or the standard
of review should be far more onerous.
While these arguments may have led to reduced litigation, they did
have drawbacks. First, making the commission’s recommendations
binding would limit the provincial legislative power over provincial
spending. The question of appropriate compensation for persons paid
from the public purse depends on an assessment of complex social and
economic facts. Courts have historically shown deference in reviewing
public policy decisions that involve the weighing of competing social
and economic evidence and legislative judgment.58
A more onerous standard of review such as correctness might also
have drawn the reviewing courts into substantive arguments about the
appropriate level of judicial compensation as they examined reasons for
government decisions on compensation levels in detail. The commission
process articulated in the Provincial Judges Reference requires that
different levels of the judiciary play the role of applicant and decisionmaker in proceedings respecting judicial compensation. The Supreme
Court does not refer to this consideration overtly. The Ontario Court of
Appeal, however, noted that while judges could be expected not to
allow personal financial gain any bearing on their decision in a
particular case, a heightened level of scrutiny in decisions respecting
judicial compensation could well raise questions about the perception of
a lack of impartiality.59
Another factor that might have led the Court to reject a more
onerous standard of review is the current level of compensation enjoyed
by provincial court judges. Although governments in many provinces
had rejected part or all of judicial compensation commission
recommendations, the increases that were implemented were very
substantial. Evidence filed in the four appeals before the Court showed

58
Tétrault-Gadoury v. Canada (Employment and Immigration Commission), [1991] S.C.J.
No. 41, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 22, at 43; McKinney v. University of Guelph, [1990] S.C.J. No. 122, [1990]
3 S.C.R. 229, at 285-86; Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989]
1 S.C.R. 927, at 990, 993-94, 999.
59
Ontario Judges Assn., supra, note 39, at para. 116 (Ont. C.A.).
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that salaries had nevertheless increased by approximately 36.6 per cent
for Quebec judges,60 50.9 per cent for New Brunswick judges,61 57.7 per
cent for Ontario judges62 and from 54.5 per cent to 134 per cent for
Alberta justices of the peace.63 These facts countered any potential
concern that governments’ rejection of various commission decisions
had rendered the commission process ineffective.
(b) Remedial Deference
The Court’s disposition of remedial questions also serves to dissuade
litigation. The Court held that if a constitutional defect is found to lie with
the government’s decision, then the matter should be returned to the
government for reconsideration in light of the Court’s reasons, as was
done in Quebec.64 Alternatively, if the defect lies in the commission
process or recommendations, then it may be appropriate to direct the
commission to reconsider the matter and provide a new recommendation
to government. The Court emphasized that it is “not appropriate for this
Court to dictate the approach that should be taken in order to rectify the
situation. Since there is more than one way to do so, it is the
government’s task to determine which approach it prefers.”65
The effect of the decision on remedy is that judicial associations
will generally not be able to use judicial review as a way to have a

60
Conférence des juges du Québec v. Quebec (Attorney General), S.C.C. Court File No.
30477, Appellant’s Record, pp. 2543, 2656.
61
Provincial Court Judges Assn. of New Brunswick v. New Brunswick (Minister of
Justice), S.C.C. Court File No. 30006, Appellants’ record, vol. II, p. 314, vol. IV, pp. 802-803;
Respondent’s Factum, para. 7.
62
Ontario Judges Assn. v. Ontario (Management Board), S.C.C. Court File No. 30148,
Appellant’s Record, vol. 1, pp. 56, 59, 149, vol. II, p. 300, vol. IV, p. 699.
63
Bodner v. Alberta, S.C.C. Court File No. 29525, Appellant’s Record, vol. II, pp. 139,
219-220, 222.
64
Provincial Judges Compensation Appeals, supra, note 4, at para. 171.
65
Id., at para. 44; Mackin v. New Brunswick (Minister of Finance); Rice v. New
Brunswick, [2002] S.C.J. No. 13, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 405, at para. 77. See also Provincial Court
Judges Assn. of British Columbia, supra, note 33, at paras. 25, 31-34; Provincial Judges Reference,
supra, note 2, at paras. 175-76; Ontario Federation of Justices of the Peace Assns. v. Ontario
(Chair of Management Board), [1999] O.J. No. 786, 43 O.R. (3d) 541, at 575-79 O.R. (Div. Ct.).
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compensation commission’s recommendations implemented.66 The more
likely remedy would be reconsideration by government or a new, nonbinding commission recommendation. In either event, the outcome
would be unpredictable and may not result in a commission’s
recommendations being implemented.
(c) Normal Costs Rules Apply
Finally, the Court’s decision on costs is also likely to reduce the
frequency of litigation over government decisions on judicial
compensation. The Court held that the Alberta Court of Appeal and
Court of Queen’s Bench erred in awarding solicitor client costs against
the province absent reprehensible, scandalous or outrageous conduct.
The Court also confirmed its earlier pronouncement in Mackin67 that
while the protection of judicial independence is a noble objective, that
on its own it is not sufficient to warrant an award of solicitor-client
costs.68 The Court awarded costs to Ontario and other provinces that
were successful in the litigation.69
The Court’s handling of costs makes clear that judicial associations
will not receive preferable treatment in comparison with other litigants.
This provides additional incentive for the judicial associations to
exercise discipline in deciding whether to apply for judicial review of
government decisions respecting commission reports.
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An exception is that courts may order recommendations implemented where legislation
specifies that the recommendations are either binding or come into effect automatically unless
rejected by the government. Where the recommendations come into effect automatically, a court
order of implementation merely gives effect to that law (see Provincial Judges Reference, supra,
note 2, at para. 294; Ontario Conference of Judges v. Ontario (Chair, Management Board), [2004]
O.J. No. 2643, 71 O.R. (3d) 528 (Div. Ct.); Newfoundland Assn. of Provincial Court Judges, supra,
note 33, at paras. 100-104; Alberta Provincial Judges’ Assn., supra, note 33, at para. 29; Courts of
Justice Act, R.S.Q. c. T-16, s. 246.44, cited in the appendix to Conférence des Juges, supra, note
33, at 557; Provincial Court Judges Assn. of British Columbia, supra, note 33, at para. 1
(Provincial Court Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 379, s. 14).
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Mackin, supra, note 65, at paras. 86-87.
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Provincial Judges Compensation Appeals, supra, note 4, at para. 132; see also the
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Provincial Court Judges v. Newfoundland, supra, note 33, at paras. 282, 293, 299.
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2. Other Impacts of Decision
Although litigation may be diminished as a result of this decision, the
commission process is clearly entrenched. The Court never questioned
the constitutional requirement or wisdom of the commission process, as
had La Forest J., in dissent, in the 1997 decision.70 As well, none of the
parties before the Court suggested that the commission process should
be abolished for provincial court judges.71 Instead the parties focused
exclusively on what is required to ensure that the commission process is
effective.
The Court’s commitment to the commission process is not
surprising in light of its decision in Mackin, supra. In that case, two
supernumerary provincial court judges challenged the government’s
decision to abolish the office of supernumerary judge, which permitted
judges over age 65 to take on a reduced (40 per cent) workload for full
compensation, and to replace it with per diem sittings. The Court held
that there was no breach of security of tenure, but found that the
elimination of supernumerary status amounted to a change in judicial
compensation because it amounted to the withdrawal of a future benefit
for all currently sitting judges. The change was unconstitutional because
the proposal was not put to the commission for a recommendation.72
Had the court wished to limit the commission’s function, it could
have done so in Mackin by concluding that the commission process was
required only for direct review of salary and benefits but not for indirect
changes to compensation incidental to changes to bona fide court
reforms. The Court clearly viewed the commission process as an
important requirement of judicial independence. Similarly, the decision
to limit the scope of judicial review of government decisions in the 2005
Provincial Judges Compensation Appeals does not reflect a
reconsideration of the appropriateness of the commission requirement
itself.
One final potential effect of this decision is that judicial associations
and governments are likely to focus more on the evidence adduced
before the commission. The Court held that government decisions must
70

Provincial Judges Reference, supra, note 2, at paras. 302-304, 337, La Forest J.
(dissenting).
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Alberta and some government interveners argued unsuccessfully in the appeal in
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the peace.
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be responsive to the commission recommendations and, absent new
facts or circumstances, cannot be based on facts or reasons that could
have been put before the commission but were not.73 This means that the
evidence and submissions before the commission will dictate any
leeway that the government will have in responding to the
recommendations. Although the experience across the country has been
that commission processes were never taken lightly by either side, this
new decision provides further incentive for ensuring that arguments and
facts are fully canvassed.
3. Unresolved Issues
(a) Developing an Ongoing Relationship
The 1997 Provincial Judges Reference and 2005 Provincial Judges
Compensation Appeals leave open the extent to which governments and
the judiciary (or their representative associations) may communicate
about judicial compensation, outside the commission inquiry process. In
the 1997 Provincial Judges Reference, the Court was intent on avoiding
negotiations over judicial compensation and, in particular, the potential
apprehension of undue influence that might arise as a result of “horsetrading” that typically forms part of collective bargaining.74 To do this,
the Court decided to interpose the commission process between the
judiciary and the government as an “institutional sieve” to provide a
forum for the objective consideration of the appropriate level of judicial
compensation without direct negotiations between the parties.75
The resulting litigation over rejected compensation commission
recommendations, however, presented a new problem. As the Court
observed in its decision in the Provincial Judges Compensation
Appeals, negotiation had been replaced by litigation and the objective of
depoliticizing judicial/government relations was not achieved.76 The
Court responded by making clear that this recourse will not result in
government decisions being overturned, save in limited circumstances.
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Another possible avenue to diminish the need for litigation would
be to revisit the strict limits placed on negotiations in the 1997
Provincial Judges Reference. The ability to discuss issues respecting
compensation informally might assist in depoliticizing relations. Most
other compensation decisions involving payments from the public purse
involve lengthy negotiations, mediations and ongoing consultations. The
resulting agreement receives approval from both politicians and union
or association members. The parties learn to work together, not just
when bargaining a new collective agreement, but also during the life of
the agreement.
By contrast, the commission process for resolving judicial
compensation disputes is typically formal, sporadic and confrontational.
Lawyers typically represent both sides. The process resembles the
adversarial nature of a trial or arbitration process, which is normally a
course of last resort used only when negotiation and consensus building
have failed. If the two sides were able to communicate each other’s
concerns in a less formal and adversarial setting, focus on interest-based
discussions and engage a mediator to help resolve issues, they may be
able to narrow issues in dispute.
The majority reasons in the 1997 Provincial Judges Reference
appear, however, to create a disincentive for governments and the
judiciary to seek agreement outside the adversarial commission process.
The Court’s clearly stated concern that negotiation may give rise to a
reasonable apprehension that judges’ interests in matters at stake in
negotiations may compromise their impartiality77 would set a very low
threshold if applied strictly. As La Forest J. observed in dissent,
however, one would expect that “a reasonable person … would believe
judges are made of sturdier stuff than this”.78
On the other hand, some comments in the majority’s reasons in the
Provincial Judges Reference suggest that consultation and discussion
between government and judiciary may be permissible, provided both
sides avoid hard-bargaining tactics that could cause a perception that the
courts may be subject to undue influence in their decision-making. For
instance, the majority appears to contemplate some degree of direct
discussions in stating that the prohibition on negotiations “does not
preclude expressions of concern or representations by chief justices and
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chief judges, and organizations that represent judges, to governments
regarding the adequacy of judicial remuneration”.79 The Court also
expressly recommended consultation with the judiciary in designing
commission processes.80
In addition, in Ontario, the 1992 Commission Report was based in part
on a joint review of the provincial judges’ pension plan. One of Ontario’s
reasons for rejecting the Commission’s pension recommendations in its
subsequent 1999 report was that no demographic changes had taken place
since the joint recommendation was made and accepted. The Court
accepted this reason as legitimate without making any negative comment
on the collaborative process involving the joint submission.81
The Alberta government and Alberta Provincial Judges Association
also made a joint submission to the Alberta Judicial Compensation
Commission during its 2000 inquiry. The parties made clear that the
joint submission was provided “simply to assist the 2000 Commission in
its work, and in full recognition and acknowledgement that, as required
by Canadian constitutional law, the 2000 Commission must be an
objective, independent, and effective body which has the power to make
a recommendation at variance with a joint submission”.82
Governments and judicial associations seeking to take a more
collaborative approach to the determination of judicial compensation
should nevertheless exercise caution. The majority in the Provincial
Judges Reference was critical of the Manitoba government and, to some
extent, the judicial association in that province, over the fact that they
agreed to put a joint submission to the Commission. The Court’s concern,
however, seems directed more to the apparent expectation, expressed in
correspondence between the parties, that the commission would “rubberstamp” the proposal without conducting a hearing, than to the fact that a
joint proposal to the commission was considered at all.83
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(b) Spectrum of Judicial Independence Requirements
Another issue not fully resolved in the Provincial Judges Compensation
Appeals is the way in which the established principle that the essential
requirements of judicial independence should be construed flexibly with
respect to various courts and tribunals applies in practice. The Court
applied the same standard to all the cases before it, even though one
case dealt with justices of the peace.
In the case of Bodner, one of the consolidated appeals, Alberta and
some government interveners argued unsuccessfully that the principle of
judicial independence did not require an independent, objective
commission process for determining justices of the peace’s
compensation. The Court rejected this argument and concluded that a
commission was both legislatively and constitutionally required for
Alberta’s justices of the peace. 84
In other recent cases, however, the Court has affirmed the flexible
application of judicial independence requirements. In Re Therrien, the
Court confirmed that constitutional judicial independence principles
applied flexibly in concluding that removal of a provincial court judge
from office did not require a legislative address similar to the address of
Parliament and the Senate required for removal of superior court judges:
These essential conditions should instead respect that diversity and be
construed flexibly. Accordingly, there should be no uniform standard
imposed or specific legislative formula dictated as supposedly
prevailing. It will be sufficient if the essence of these conditions is
respected…85

In Ell v. Alberta, the Court also referred to the principle that the
mechanisms required to achieve minimum constitutional judicial
independence requirements will vary.86 In that case, justices of the peace
were effectively removed from office by the imposition of new
minimum qualifications without any grandparenting provision for
justices of the peace currently holding office. The Court confirmed that

84
Provincial Judges Compensation Appeals, supra, note 4, at para. 121; the Ontario
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65, at 562-63 O.R.).
85
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requirements of judicial independence apply flexibly among various
decision-makers in concluding that judicial independence had not been
compromised:
The level of security of tenure that is constitutionally required will
depend upon the specific context of the court or tribunal. Superior
court judges are removable only by a joint address of the House of
Commons and the Senate, as stipulated by s. 99 of the Constitution
Act, 1867. This level of tenure reflects the historical and modern
position of superior courts as the core of Canada’s judicial structure
and as the central guardians of the rule of law. Less rigorous
conditions apply in the context of provincial courts, which are
creatures of statute, but which nonetheless perform significant
constitutional tasks.87

The Court in Ell concluded that the requirement that judicial officers
only be removed for cause cannot be applied as rigidly where removal
occurs by legislative means.88 The Court found that the legislation in
issue was part of a legislative measure that was “reasonably intended to
further the interests that underlie the principle of judicial independence”,
in particular public confidence in the administration of justice and the
maintenance of a strong and independent judiciary.89 As a result, a
reasonable and informed person would perceive the reforms to the office
to strengthen, rather than diminish, the independence and qualifications
of Alberta’s justices of the peace.90

VI. CONCLUSION
The Court’s decision in the 2005 Provincial Judges Compensation
Appeals is likely to curb litigation respecting judicial compensation in
the near future. It makes clear that decisions respecting judicial
compensation affect the allocation of public funds, a matter properly
within the purview of the provinces. The role of the commission is
87
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confirmed, not as a body charged with determining the appropriate level
of judicial compensation, but as a consultation and recommendation
process designed to ensure that governments have independent and
objective advice and give genuine consideration to the commission’s
recommendations.
The level of deference afforded governments is very high. Only
where a government’s conduct or reasons reflect a failure to give
consideration or be responsive to a commission’s recommendations will
the Court set aside a recommendation. The fact that the remedy will
likely be limited to returning the decision for reconsideration by
government, and that judges may end up paying for both sides’ costs of
litigation, will likely encourage associations representing the judiciary
to exercise discipline in deciding whether to challenge decisions
respecting their compensation in the courts.
The effect of the decision is not limited to reducing litigation over
judicial compensation. As well, the Court has signalled that the
commission process, although only recommendatory, must nevertheless
remain robust. Because the government’s response must deal with facts
and arguments before the commission, the parties will have to ensure
that all relevant facts and submissions are on the record.
Finally, the decision does not address other related issues that may
arise in the future. Specifically, it leaves open questions about the extent
to which governments and the judiciary may engage in ongoing
consultations in order to resolve compensation-related issues apart from
the commission process. It also remains to be seen which elements of
judicial independence apply to other decision makers that operate within
the court system.

